Myline Cordial

Joel P. Libuit vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 154363, September 13, 2005
469 SCRA 610

FACTS:
In May 1993, private complainant Domingo del Mundo brought his car to the motor shop owned by petitioner Joel Libuit for repair. The car was received by a mechanic in the presence of the petitioner who assured the private complainant that it would be safe in his motor shop.

Eight months later, private complainant returned to the motor shop but the repair work was not finished yet and he was assured that they would finish and deliver the car after two weeks. However, the petitioner failed to deliver the car to the owner. Private complainant gave him another two weeks to finish the repairs. Thereafter, the private complainant returned to the motor shop and found that his car was already missing. He reported the matter to the police, who discovered that the petitioner had sold the car’s differential and cylinder head, while the engine could no longer be found. He filed a complaint for estafa.

On arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.

On trial, petitioner testified on direct examination. However, his defense counsel withdrew from the case after his initial cross-examination. On motion of the petitioner, the continuation of his cross-examination was reset to give him time to engage the services of another counsel. The petitioner eventually secured the services of a new counsel.

At the subsequent hearings, his new counsel failed to appear despite notices. On motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order striking from the records the petitioner’s direct testimony and declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on record.

After further proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.
Petitioner’s contention: the trial court should have appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel consistently failed to appear for his cross-examination

RULING:
NO. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice. Worth noting, when the time for the presentation of evidence for the defense arrived, and the defendant appeared by himself alone, the absence of his counsel was inexcusable.

In the present case, since the petitioner was represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment and trial, the trial court could not be deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the continuation of his cross-examination. After his initial cross-examination, the trial court granted the petitioner’s motion to postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage the services of another counsel. The failure of his newly hired lawyer to appear at the subsequent hearings without reason was sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the striking from the records of his direct testimony, and thereafter render judgment upon the evidence already presented. In fact, the repeated failure to appear of defendant’s counsel at the trial may even be taken as a deliberate attempt to delay the court’s proceedings.

NOTES:

The elements of estafa under Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and, (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

Factual findings of the appellate court are generally conclusive
Factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on review by us, in the absence of any clear showing that the lower courts overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case. The jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals. The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion

Even a temporary disturbance of property rights constitutes misappropriation. (Salazar vs. People, 391 SCRA 162[2002])

Full Text: Libuit vs People G.R. No. 154363, September 13, 2005