Myline Cordial

Vicente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, Eliza Jujeurche Sunga and Francisco Salva
G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000
332 SCRA 356

FACTS:
Respondent, Eliza Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. The jeepney was already filled with passengers so she was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a wooden stool at the back of the door. As she was seated at the rear end of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Unfortunately, a truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.

Sunga then filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the truck.

RTC’s decision: Absolved Calalas of liability and ruled that Salva as third-party defendant was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.

CA’s decision: reversed RTC’s ruling on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. It also dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent passenger is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict.
2. Whether or not respondent carrier is responsible for the injury caused to its passenger when the accident was caused by another vehicle.
3. Whether or not the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito.
4. Whether or not respondent passenger is entitled to moral damages.

RULING:
1. No. The principle of res judicata does not apply where a party in a pending case was never a party in a previous one. And besides, the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner’s jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.

2. Yes. The liability of petitioner arises from his negligence in the performance of his contractual obligation or breach of contract of carriage. Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death or injuries to passengers, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is now the duty of petitioner to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. However, in this case, petitioner failed to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. It was found that the jeepney was not properly parked and he took more passengers than the allowed seating capacity.

3. No. The taking of an “extension seat” is not an implied assumption of risk on the part of the passenger. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the obligor’s will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the obligor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the obligor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.

4. No. Petitioner did not act in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.

NOTES:

In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it s the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.

Doctrine of Proximate Cause
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract.

Presumption of Negligence
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.

Bad faith
The common carrier’s admission in open court that his driver failed to assist the injured passenger in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith.

The rules on extraordinary responsibility of common carriers remain basically unchanged even when the contract is breached by tort although noncontradictory principles on quasi-delict may then be assimilated as also forming part of the governing law. (Sabena Belgian World Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 38 [1996])

Proximate cause, which is determined by a mixed consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent, is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occured. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, 641 SCRA 326 [2000])

While the driver of an improperly parked vehicle may be liable in case of collision, the driver of a moving vehicle who had no opportunity to avoid the collision due to his own making is not relieved of liability, such as when his negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. (Austria vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 668 [2000])

Full text: Calalas vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000