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Jose Antonio Leviste vs. The Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010
615 SCRA 619

FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Leviste was convicted by the RTC of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. However, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail invoking the principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:
In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:
NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean automatic grant of bail in case of appeal. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.

The rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. The “tough on bail pending” policy must be observed. Presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such as those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the rial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or lifeimprisonment where bail is prohibited.

Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, Explained
Said provision applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following rules:
x x x x x x x x x
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x

NOTES:

Purpose of Bail
Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required, is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the “dubious interval,” often years long, between arrest and final adjudication?

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison. On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accused’s flight from court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the accused.

The appellate court has the jurisdiction to hear the motion for bail when the conviction changes the penalty from non-bailable to bailable
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.

Grave abuse of discretion
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.

Extraordinary writ of certiorari
Petitioner only points out the Court of Appeal’s erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. In this connection, Lee v. People is apropos:
… Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

Judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.” Choice occurs where, between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is “more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker.” On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that “upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.”

Statutory Construction
Laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioner’s interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years’ imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.

Legal Research
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.

Penalties
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated the “tough on bail pending appeal” configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction. Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the “tough on bail pending appeal” policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.

Presumption of Innocence
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.

Termination of Presumption of Innocence
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.

Full text: Leviste v. The Court of Appeals G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010